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ABSTRACT:  Taking human experimentation into account, this work aims at estimating the 
relationship between  transaction costs, which are related to the protection system of patients’ 
rights, and localization of pharmaceutical industry’s testing phase. Assuming that the 
competitiveness of the protection system is based on the time required to obtain an authorization 
for an experimental activity, pharmaceutical clinical research should be positively affected by a 
process aimed at internalizing the review process, if efficient. By analyzing said system with 
operational research, this paper concludes suggesting the potentiality of a competitive system of 
reviewers, that is to say, the efficiency of that internalization process is performed by medical 
centers in which the experimental treatments are proposed to subjects.   
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
he concept of transaction costs has 
been introduced by Coase (1937), 
studying firms and market 
organization. However, as suggested by 
Coase himself (1988), the assumption of 
positive transaction costs, instead of zero 
costs, has only begun to take hold after two 
decades. This turning point is due to two 
contributions (Coase, 1960; Arrow, 1969) 
in which the necessity to study the real 
world of positive transaction costs and the 
failure of many current theories is 
underlined. 
In the following years, the idea of positive 
transaction costs was deeply analyzed, 
especially in the field of governance, i.e. 
how activities and exchanges are 
appropriately, or inappropriately, organized 
to minimize these positive transaction costs. 
As suggested by Wlliamson (2009) in his 
Nobel Prize lecture, “…governance is the 
overarching concept and transaction cost 
economics is the means by which to breathe 
operational content into governance and 
organization…”. In other words, a strong 
link between transaction costs and 
organization, as well as governance, exists 
and the importance of the topic is 
demonstrated by the Nobel Prize winner. 
Wlliamson’s work on issues of governance 
(1979, 1996, 2002, 2008), as suggested by 
Figueiredo (2010), has a significant impact 
on several fields, including the development 
of public organization.  
Starting from their analysis, this paper 
aims at empirically studying a specific 
public sector and the impact of an 
internalization process geared towards 
reducing the transaction costs that might 
prevent an exchange of innovation for 
information. This specific exchange can 
affect the regions’ competitiveness on a 
particular kind of national market: the 
market of human experimentation. The 
specific public sector of this analysis is the 
protection system of research subjects, 
which is mainly based on Institutional 
Review Boards (IRB). According to 
Calabresi (1969), these IRBs are the 
institutions through which society can 
evaluate the acceptable risk of killing 
someone for the sake of scientific progress, 
since they represent the moral values of 
these cultures. Currently, both in Europe 
and in the U.S., the protection systems of 
patients’ rights are guaranteed by these 
boards and this analysis is performed 
around them. Referring to the idea of Arrow 
(1963) about the medical care market, 
Ippoliti (2010) suggests the existence of a 
specific sub-market in which innovation is 
exchanged for information, where the 
former is given by experimental medical 
treatments (i.e. the difference, in terms of 
expected effectiveness, between the 
experimental treatment and the current 
one), whereas the latter is given by clinical 
evidence about experimental treatments (i.e. 
evidence about the safety and effectiveness 
of candidate drugs). According to this idea 
of market, the national protection system of 
patients’ rights and its ex-ante authorization 
process can affect the abovementioned 
exchange, as well as the competitiveness of 
countries. This competitiveness is based on 
transaction costs, that is to say, the costs 
necessary to obtain ethical opinions on an 
experimental protocol and to start the 
exchange. In other words, the lower the 
time (or the required conditions) necessary 
to perform the exchange of innovation for 
information, the higher the number of 
experimental activities implemented by 
pharmaceutical companies and, therefore, 
the higher the national competitiveness on 
the market of human experimentation.  
T 
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Considering the proposed background and 
through Operational Research (OR), this 
paper analyzes if the review process should 
be internalized within the medical centers, 
in which the experimental activity is 
performed, or not. In other words, the paper 
studies if this internalization process is 
more or less efficient. It will also suggest 
some conclusions that public stakeholders 
may find relevant: a normative analysis of 
the protection system of patients’ rights, 
investigating how an optimal protection 
system might be shaped in order to be 
competitive.   
The paper is divided in three sections. 
The second section describes the nature of 
transaction costs within the realm of human 
experimentation, while also presenting the 
legal background around which the specific 
national case study is shaped. Through Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the third 
section presents an operational research to 
achieve the main target of this work. The 
paper concludes with some remarks, 
considering the public stakeholders’ point 
of view and the potential political influence 
on the decision of creating an efficient 
protection system of patients’ rights.  
2. TRANSACTION COSTS AND        
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
Currently, human experimentation is 
related to pharmaceutical clinical research. 
We are talking about the testing phase of 
candidate drugs in order to collect clinical 
evidence about experimental treatments. 
This information is essential to obtain 
manufacturing authorization from national 
drug agencies and thus to make profit on 
patients and their diseases. In other words, 
before the manufacturing of the drug, it is 
necessary to know how effective we can 
expect the product to be. However, 
manufacturing authorization is not the only 
ex-ante check. Human experimentation can 
be considered the realm of ex-ante 
regulation: each clinical research has to be 
authorized by an IRB before starting the 
testing phase of the experimental treatment 
on patients. Obviously, the need for a 
strong regulation system is clearly affected 
by the specific technical knowledge 
necessary to evaluate if the expected and 
unexpected risks are acceptable or not, as 
well as the scientific rationale of the 
proposed trial. 
 
Figure 1: Production process of the pharmaceutical industry   
 
    Source: Les Entreprises du Médicament (LEEM)* 
     *For a deeper analysis see the LEEM report entitled “L’industrie du médicament en France, réalités économiques”, 2008 Edition. 
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Figure 1 shows the pharmaceutical 
companies’ production process. What we 
are interested in is clinical research, which 
is exactly the abovementioned testing phase 
of innovative treatments. Considering the 
protection system of patients’ rights, we can 
imagine that the key factor in this specific 
phase is the time needed to obtain an 
opinion about the experimental use of these 
candidate drugs on patients. Decreasing the 
time this phase takes means maximizing the 
expected profit in the marketing phase. In 
other words, one day saved in the 
bargaining process to obtain an 
authorization means one day gained to sell 
the drug on the market with monopolistic 
power. For this reason, we can talk about 
the required time to obtain an authorization 
as the main price of starting an 
experimental treatment and the collection of 
clinical evidence.1 
According to the literature mentioned in 
the previous section, transaction costs can 
be thought of as the costs of an exchange. 
Referring to the idea of human 
experimentation in terms of market, an 
exchange of clinical evidence for 
innovation in medical treatments is 
foreseeable. However, due to the ex-ante 
                                                 
                                                
1 Clinical trials are conducted in phases. Each phase 
has a different purpose and helps scientists answer 
different questions. For each step of this clinical 
investigation, a specific ethical opinion must be 
provided by the competent IRB. In details, there are 
three phases in pharmaceutical clinical research with, 
according to the National Health Institute, the 
following features: “…Studies of phase I in which 
researchers test an experimental drug or treatment on 
a small group of healthy people (20-80) for the first 
time to evaluate its safety, determine a safe dosage 
range, and identify side effects... in phase II trials, the 
experimental study drug or treatment is given to a 
larger group of people (100-300) to see if it is 
effective and to further evaluate its safety… in phase 
III trials, the experimental study drug or treatment is 
given to large groups of people (1,000-3,000) to 
confirm its effectiveness, monitor side effects, 
compare it to commonly used treatments, and collect 
information that will allow the experimental drug or 
treatment to be used safely…”. 
control that is performed by IRBs, there is a 
cost (i.e. a positive transaction cost) that 
companies have to bear in order to perform 
this exchange: the cost of obtaining the 
ethical opinion on this innovative treatment. 
According to what has been presented in 
the profit maximization process of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the key factor of 
the authorization process is the time needed 
to obtain that opinion, that is to say, the 
time necessary to perform the exchange 
between companies and patients. Cooter 
and Ulen (2000) suggest that there are three 
main potential transaction costs 
corresponding to the three steps of an 
exchange: search costs, bargaining costs, 
and enforcement costs. The bargaining 
phase is the main cost involved in this 
specific phase of the pharmaceutical 
industry’s production process. Indeed, a 
negotiation in the authorization process 
between companies and IRBs is 
foreseeable. For example, one of the main 
negotiations could deal with the informed 
consent, i.e. the main risks (expected and 
unexpected adverse events) that have been 
included in that document. This is 
essentially to estimate the degree of risk 
sharing among the parties since research 
subjects are responsible for all the expected 
adverse events that are included in the 
informed consent whereas companies bear 
all the unexpected ones.2  
According to the European Union’s 
directives on human experimentation and 
protection system of patients’ rights 
(2005/28/EC and 2001/20/EC), in Europe 
 
2 From this prospective, the Informed Consent can be 
seen as a contract between companies and patients. 
Upon signing the contract, research subjects become 
responsible for all the expected risks listed in the 
document. Obviously, note that all adverse events 
that are not included in the Informed Consent could 
be potential unexpected ones. For this reason, the 
bargaining on this information might be significant. 
For a deeper analysis of this issue, see Ippoliti (2010).  
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each protocol has to be authorized ex-ante 
by a competent IRB. However, these 
directives have been integrated by each 
European country into national law with 
different features regarding the governance 
of these IRB systems. For instance, there 
are countries that have decided to adopt 
centralized systems (e.g. Croatia and its 
single national IRB), regional systems (e.g. 
France and its departmental system) or local 
systems (e.g. Italy and its local network of 
IRBs). Another issue concerns the 
requirement of a single opinion, rather than 
two. The European Directive suggests that 
pharmaceutical companies’ experimental 
protocols can be evaluated with a single 
opinion by a competent national IRB. 
Afterwards, that single opinion can be 
extended to all the country’s medical 
centers.3 Also in this case there are national 
differences in the adoption of the Directive. 
Indeed, some countries (e.g. Italy) have 
decided to accept the single opinion but 
with a procedure of accepting/refusing that 
opinion by all competent IRBs involved in 
the authorization process (i.e. second 
opinion). Anyway, how do national choices 
in adopting the European Directives affect 
transaction costs? Coase’s theorem suggests 
that the law can encourage bargaining by 
lowering transaction costs (Coase, 1960). 
According to his idea of market, this should 
be exactly the final target of this process in 
order to increase the pharmaceutical 
companies’ investments in the testing phase 
(i.e. the exchange among companies and 
patients).  
The two examples mentioned above will 
be relevant for the proposed analysis, since 
it focuses exactly on these key factors to 
 
                                                
3 In case of a negative single opinion, the trial cannot 
be proposed in that country again. Alternatively, the 
Directive suggests the possibility of obtaining an 
opinion from each territorially competent IRB.  
estimate the relationship between clinical 
research and transaction costs, and to 
validate the idea of transaction costs applied 
to human experimentation.  
In Italy, the European Directives on 
human experimentation have been 
acknowledged with the Ministerial Decree 
of 06/11/2007 and Legislative Decree no. 
211 of 24/06/2003. According to these 
laws, the Italian protection system includes 
a single opinion by the coordinator medical 
center and then a second opinion by each 
IRB competent for the satellite medical 
centers. This second opinion can accept, or 
not, the previous single opinion of the 
coordinator center. This is a specific feature 
of the Italian IRB system since, as 
mentioned above, the European Directive 
suggests that a single opinion should be 
valid for the whole country, without 
needing a second opinion by the satellite 
centers. Moreover, within the Italian 
governance, each region is entrusted with 
organizing and setting up a local network of 
IRBs (i.e. 21 competent authorities). This 
creates a system of 21 regional networks of 
IRBs with common features, as well as 
differences like, for instance, the 
administrative procedures to obtain the 
ethical opinions. Obviously, the exchange 
between the pharmaceutical industry and 
patients could be affected negatively only 
by the combination of these two features 
(i.e. local system and second opinion).4 The 
awareness about the Italian difficulties on 
the European market of human  
 
 
4 The average time the coordinator of an Italian 
Institutional Review Board takes to come to a 
decision is 35 days, while the satellite takes 50 days. 
Considering also that the authorization from the 
institution where the trial is conducted takes time, this 
means that it usually takes at least 4 months before an 
exchange can be performed. See AIFA, La 
sperimentazione clinica dei medicinali in Italia, 8° 
Rapporto Nazionale, 2009. 
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Table 1: Protection system of patients’ rights 
Italy, 2007 
 
Region 
Population/I
RB 
IRB Population 
Umbria                       878709 1 878709 
Piedmont                     625292 7 4377047 
P.A. of Trento 510194 1 510194 
Emilia Romagna               472170 9 4249533 
Veneto                       436632 11 4802947 
Puglia                       313324 13 4073208 
Toscana                      281356 13 3657630 
P.A. of Bolzano 245396 2 490792 
Campania                     232032 25 5800789 
Abruzzi                      219482 6 1316892 
Italy 219097 271 59375295 
Marche                       171620 9 1544581 
Lazio                        167490 33 5527163 
Sardinia                     166253 10 1662530 
Liguria                      160885 10 1608850 
Molise                       160228 2 320456 
Lombardy                    157277 61 9593924 
Sicilia                      156977 32 5023272 
Calabria                     154068 13 2002880 
Friuli Venetia Giulia            152167 8 1217332 
Basilicata                   147793 4 591170 
Valle d'Aosta 125396 1 125396 
                 Sources: AIFA and ISTAT 
 
experimentation is probably the main 
reason that led to the Ministerial Decree of 
12/05/2006. Indeed, the idea behind this 
reform is the harmonization of all the 
different administrative procedures to 
obtain an ethical review, in order to achieve 
a considerable decrease in the time needed 
by IRBs to provide their opinions. 
However, this harmonization process might 
be only one positive input, among several 
others, to increase the Italian 
competitiveness on the European market of 
human experimentation.  
In the next section the paper presents data 
and methodology applied to the Operational 
Research. 
3. ITALIAN IRB SYSTEM 
Taking 2007 into account, there are 271 
Institutional Review Boards (IRB) in Italy. 
Table 1 shows that, on average, there are 
219,097 citizens for each IRB in Italy but 
this number changes within each region. 
Indeed, the Italian protection system is 
shaped around a regional network of IRBs. 
For instance, the region of Umbria has only 
1 IRB whereas the region of Piedmont has 
decided to develop this network of 
protection system based on 7 IRBs. In any 
case, both regional systems are shaped 
around a limited number of IRBs depending 
on their population, as described in table 1. 
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Table 2: Poisson regression model (cross-sectional time-series with fixed-effects option) 
Italy, from 2000 to 2007 
 
 (count variable) (count variable) (count variable) 
VARIABLES Number of IRB Number of IRB Number of IRB 
Medical centers 0.109***   
 (0.0360)   
Clinical studies  0.0873***  
  (0.0276)  
Research Index   0.0961*** 
   (0.0311) 
Law reform -0.151** -0.148** -0.130* 
 (0.0709) (0.0700) (0.0682) 
F statistic (p value>chi2)    
Wald chi2(2) 10.17 10.98 10.52 
Prob > chi2 0.0062 0.0041 0.0052 
Observations 8 8 8 
Number of Countries 1 1 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Other regions, such as Friuli Venetia Giulia 
and Basilicata, have opted for a higher 
number of IRBs.  
The idea of a local protection system is 
consistent with the authorization process of 
experimental protocols, since a double 
authorization is necessary (the opinion of 
the IRB competent for the coordinator 
center and the second opinion of each local 
IRB). According to this rule, each regional 
policy about the protection system of 
patients’ rights is affected by the demand of 
clinical evidence by pharmaceutical 
companies. In other words, the main 
regional policy is as follows: the higher the 
number of experimental protocols, the 
higher the number of IRBs to evaluate these 
trials. 
Table 2 shows the positive link between 
the supply of innovative medical treatments 
and the number of local IRBs, as well as the 
impact of the law reform on this value. The 
proposed model is a Poisson regression, 
cross sectional time-series, applying the 
fixed-effects option. Data about the number 
of IRB are extracted from the annual report 
of the Italian Drug Agency (AIFA)5, 
whereas data about the dependent variables 
are medical centers, clinical studies6 and a 
Research Index  (Ippoliti, 2011b). These 
variables are extracted from the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) and in particular 
medical centers are the medical care 
facilities where experimental treatments are 
performed, whereas clinical studies are 
exactly those innovative treatments.  
                                                 
5 The reports analyzed to estimate the protection 
systems of patients’ rights refer to the period from 
5/2006 to 8/2009. These reports can be downloaded 
from the Drug Agency’s website: 
http://www.agenziafarmaco.gov.it/ .  
6 This work considers all clinical studies of phase II 
and III funded by the Industry. 
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The Research Index is a combination of 
medical centers and clinical studies, which 
might be able to catch the national 
competitiveness on the market. This index 
represents a good proxy of pharmaceutical 
investments in Europe and, therefore, 
countries’ competitiveness on the European 
market of human experimentation.  
The deviance goodness-of-fit test is 
acceptable and, considering the resulting 
chi2 p-value, the models are considered 
well fitting. Moreover, even if only 1 
country is considered for 8 years, the result 
is statistically consistent with both the 
number of medical centers and the number 
of clinical studies, as well as with the 
Research Index. 
The table supports the common policy 
followed by all regions in this specific field, 
i.e. the higher the number of trials, the 
higher the number of IRBs internalized in 
the medical facilities where the trials are 
performed. At the same time, the table 
shows the impact of the law (i.e. Ministerial 
Decree of 12/05/2006) on the number of 
IRBs. According to the reform, a specific 
setup of the IRBs is required (i.e. minimum 
requirements about the boards’ 
composition). This means that, between 
2006 and 2007, 37 IRBs did not pass the 
validation process linked to these 
requirements and this is why Table 2 
presents a negative coefficient in all three 
regressions (i.e. law reform). However, the 
reduction of local IRBs has not been the 
target of that law, but only an indirect 
consequence of that measure.  
The issue is the following: is the  
 
 
 
internalization of the review process  
efficient? In other words, is a high or a low 
number of reviewers more efficient? Which 
might be the best regional policy in the 
shaping of local networks of IRBs?  
The next sub-sections try to provide an 
answer to this efficiency question 
performing an OR. Obviously, in order to 
suggest a consistent explanation, a study of 
the local situation instead of an 
international one is necessary. Hence, a 
national data-set is used.  
The analysis of health care systems’ 
performance through an OR study is not 
new. The current bibliography suggests 
several innovative applications of OR in 
Health, at both a regional and a national 
level, focusing on quality and quantity of 
supplied medical goods (Pulina et al., 2010; 
Piacenza et al., 2010; Zuckerman et al, 
1994; Garavaglia et al., 2011). Considering 
pharmaceutical clinical research, an OR 
study is proposed by Ippoliti and Falavigna 
(2011). The authors support the thesis that 
there is a positive relation between patients’ 
perception of expected quality of medical 
treatments and regional supply of 
pharmaceutical innovation (i.e. 
experimental drugs). The nature of the 
Italian regional system makes it possible to 
develop an OR to estimate the efficiency 
relationship between the local network of 
protection systems (i.e. number of IRBs) 
and the regional supply of innovative 
medical treatments. Further analysis can 
increase the current knowledge of OR 
studies in health care and enhance the 
positive perspective of this work. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of efficiency scores, output and inputs (mean on 2005-2008) 
 
 
 
3.1 Data and methodology 
 
The methodology applied in this work to 
estimate efficiency is the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA).7 According to Cook and 
Seiford (2009), the DEA approach is a non-
parametric technique which allows us to 
measure the performance of a subject and to 
assign a score to it representing its 
efficiency performance. The two-stage 
procedure of Simar and Wilson (2007) is 
performed, i.e. the first approach (DEA 
scores) is followed by a second approach in 
which these scores are regressed for some 
key factors to explain the regions’ 
efficiency. In the first stage, the DEA 
output-oriented procedure with bootstrap is 
used to estimate the efficiency of each 
regional medical care industry and its 
                                                 
7 The DEA approach allows us to build a 
deterministic non-parametric production frontier 
comparing the performances of several Decision 
Making Units (DMUs). Technical efficiency scores 
are calculated on the basis of the radial distance of 
the subjects to the frontier. A comprehensive 
description of this approach is presented by Charnes 
et al. (1978), Färe et al. (1994) and Coelli et al. 
(1998). 
supply of innovative medical treatment; in 
the second stage, the regression analysis 
aims at showing the correlation between 
efficiency scores and national protection 
system. 
The sample is made up of 19 Italian 
regions plus 2 autonomous provinces and 
the considered panel is from 2005 to 2008. 
Obviously the choice of years is affected by 
data availability. The output is the 
pharmaceutical clinical research, 
considering all studies of phase II and III 
funded by the Industry and started in Italy. 
Based on the previous analysis, both the 
number of medical centers and the number 
of clinical trials will be considered, as well 
their combination. Inputs are the number of 
physicians and the access of patients to the 
regional ambulatories (clinical and 
diagnostic). The proposed idea of efficiency 
concerns the regions’ ability to maximize 
the supply of innovative medical treatments 
(output) considering the regional potential 
in the enrolment of research subjects 
Type Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inputs 
Physicians 84 5049.06 3788.803 278 13017 
Ambulatory 
Activity 
84 3.51e+07 3.28e+07 886825.7 1.18e+08 
Outputs 
Clinical studies 84 91.97619 76.55772 0 311 
Medical 
centers 
84 148.1548 162.8274 0 713 
Efficiency 
scores 
Score 1 83 2.569687 2.405073 1.163342 15.27147 
Score 2 83 3.233914 2.999152 1.164434 21.54154 
Score 3 83 2.549812 2.320114 1.177682 15.32819 
Independent 
variable 
Population on 
IRBs 
84 12.28024 0.584946 11.0302 13.6982 
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(inputs).8 Table 3 introduces descriptive 
statistics of inputs and outputs, as well 
efficiency scores and the independent 
variable.9 Score 1 considers clinical studies 
as output whereas score 2 regards the 
medical centers in which those trials are 
performed. Score 3 is a combination of both 
outputs, that is to say the DEA approach 
using two outputs instead of one. 
Data about clinical research (Clinical 
studies and Medical centers) are extracted 
from the dataset of the Italian Drug Agency 
(AIFA), whereas data about inputs are 
extracted from the reports of the National 
Health Care System (SSN)10 and refer to 
the public health care system.  
                                                
In the next section the second stage of 
Simar and Wilson is proposed.   
3.2 Results 
 
According to Simar and Wilson (2007), in 
the second stage the efficiency scores are 
regressed to explain the results. 
Considering Italy between 2005 and 2008, a 
multiple regression model is proposed in 
Table 4. It is a cross sectional time series 
regression model, applying the random 
effects option. In this case we assume that 
there are no significant statistical 
differences between one region and another. 
Also in this case the parameters are tested 
 
8 According to Ippoliti (2010, 2011a), the enrolment 
process can be ascribed mainly to the relation 
between the physician and the patient, which can lead 
to the production of the required clinical evidence. 
This means that the number of physicians (workers) 
and the number of potential research subjects to 
whom these physicians might propose the 
experimental treatments (raw material), can be 
considered the basic inputs for this analysis.  
9 Note that one score has not been computed since the 
output oriented approach is used but for a region 
there are no clinical studies in 2006 (i.e. Valle 
d’Aosta). 
10 Data about clinical research can be downloaded 
from: http://oss-sper-clin.agenziafarmaco.it/; whereas 
data about inputs can be downloaded from 
http://www.salute.gov.it.  
to validate the required assumptions (i.e. 
normality distribution and residuals) with 
acceptable results.   
The dependent variables are the 
efficiency scores of the previous section, 
whereas the independent variables are the 
regional population on the number of IRBs 
(see Table 1) and all regions (i.e. a dummy 
variable to identify each region). 
Considering all regions, their regional 
protection system of patients' rights is 
ranked on the basis of efficiency. In other 
words, the table suggests how the trend of 
their efficiency can change moving from 
Umbria (dropped region) to another 
region.11 
Note that, according to the DEA 
approach, a positive coefficient means a 
negative impact on efficiency scores 
whereas, obviously, a negative coefficient 
means a positive effect on the scores. The 
table empirically supports the idea that 
decreasing the number of IRBs for each 
potential research subject is not efficient, 
especially if the medical centers are 
considered. According to the proposed 
background, a process through which the 
review process is incorporated within the 
medical center in which the experimental 
activity is performed might be more 
efficient. In other words, increasing the 
number of reviewers decreases the 
transaction costs since, reasonably, the time 
necessary to perform an exchange between 
pharmaceutical companies and patients 
decreases. Indeed, if the companies' 
decision making process about locations 
(i.e. medical facilities) is affected by the  
 
                                                 
11 A category variable (i.e. country) had to be 
dropped because of collinearity and the choice of that 
country was made by the STATA software, making 
the regression. The dropped country is the base 
category against which the others are assessed. See 
Suits (1957). 
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Table 4: Multiple regression model (cross-sectional time-series with random-effects option) 
Italy, from 2005 to 2008 
 Clinical studies Medical centers Both 
VARIABLES Efficiency  
Scores 1 
Efficiency  
Scores 2 
Efficiency 
Scores 3 
Population on IRBs 0.237** 0.326** 0.229** 
 (0.110) (0.137) (0.111) 
Piedmont 0.466*** 0.824*** 0.461*** 
 (0.131) (0.165) (0.133) 
Valle d’Aosta 0.603** 0.682** 0.578** 
 (0.273) (0.343) (0.276) 
Abruzzi 0.314* 0.565** 0.305 
 (0.188) (0.236) (0.190) 
Basilicata 1.499*** 1.577*** 1.469*** 
 (0.231) (0.289) (0.233) 
P.A. of Bolzano 2.252*** 2.292*** 2.150*** 
 (0.204) (0.256) (0.206) 
Calabria 1.500*** 1.744*** 1.494*** 
 (0.228) (0.285) (0.230) 
Campania 0.986*** 1.352*** 0.979*** 
 (0.188) (0.235) (0.190) 
Emilia Romagna 0.171 0.337* 0.192 
 (0.163) (0.204) (0.165) 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.503** 0.571* 0.477** 
 (0.239) (0.299) (0.241) 
Lazio 0.387* 0.385 0.402* 
 (0.224) (0.281) (0.227) 
Liguria 0.340 0.411 0.327 
 (0.223) (0.280) (0.226) 
Lombardy 0.383* 0.442 0.435* 
 (0.225) (0.282) (0.228) 
Marche 0.793*** 0.962*** 0.778*** 
 (0.237) (0.297) (0.239) 
Molise 0.541** 0.619* 0.520** 
 (0.256) (0.321) (0.259) 
Puglia 0.949*** 1.188*** 0.939*** 
 (0.180) (0.225) (0.182) 
Sicilia 1.087*** 1.531*** 1.072*** 
 (0.223) (0.280) (0.226) 
Sardinia 0.879*** 1.098*** 0.870*** 
 (0.220) (0.276) (0.223) 
P.A. of Trento 1.841*** 1.861*** 1.840*** 
 (0.137) (0.172) (0.139) 
Veneto 0.591*** 0.999*** 0.581*** 
 (0.170) (0.213) (0.172) 
Toscana 0.256 0.514** 0.260 
 (0.179) (0.224) (0.181) 
Constant -2.980** -4.023** -2.860* 
 (1.502) (1.882) (1.519) 
F statistic (p value>chi2)    
Wald chi2(21) 875.68 603.28 809.44 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared    
Within 0.0714 0.0846 0.0653 
Between 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Overall 0.9349 0.9082 0.9299 
Observations 83 83 83 
Number of Regions 21 21 21 
               Standard errors in parentheses 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
              Umbria is the dropped region because of collinearity 
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time required to start a trial, in order to be 
competitive on the national market of 
human experimentation several medical 
institutions should adopt a policy aimed at 
internalizing this process. Even if it might 
be considered a second best, the results 
support the appropriateness of this policy, 
as clearly shown in Table 2. 
There is a final question that has to be 
answered. Is this internalization (i.e. 
authorization process) an issue linked to 
transaction costs (i.e. trying to minimize the 
time to perform an exchange) or to the 
necessity to control the ethical judgment? In 
other words, is the internalization process 
an attempt to facilitate the exchange? The 
conclusions of this work deal with the 
policy maker's point of view. According to 
the empirical results and the Italian 
background, the last section presents a 
normative analysis in order to propose a 
potential optimal protection system, which 
however proves politically inapplicable.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
A high number of competitors is an 
opportunity if an open market exists. This is 
the basic assumption of each potential 
competitive market and the regulation 
process of experimental treatments might 
be affected in the same way. Analyzing the 
issue in terms of public governance, a high 
number of reviewers might be an 
opportunity to shape a competitive market 
in the regulation process. Obviously, the 
final aim of this competitiveness can only 
be the minimization of transaction costs, i.e. 
the cost of the exchange between 
companies and patients. In other words, the 
higher the number of IRBs, the higher the 
pharmaceutical companies’ degree of 
choice (of a reviewer); but this also means 
the boards have strong incentives to be 
efficient, minimizing the transaction costs. 
Of course, if a protection system is more 
competitive, the number of innovative 
medical treatments will increase with 
positive externalities on the health care 
system (i.e. medical options with expected 
higher effectiveness, as well as economic 
investments in the testing phase and 
physicians’ training).  
Nevertheless, a competitive market needs 
some other features to work. An appropriate 
system of economic incentive is necessary, 
i.e. a system that can guarantee the 
existence of IRBs thanks to the fee of each 
authorization. This is essential to provide an 
economic incentive to be competitive on the 
market and, at the same time, to minimize 
the economic burden of these institutions 
on public society. Another point is the 
territorial competence of each IRB. For 
what concerns the Italian system, a specific 
territorial area of competence might be seen 
as as a monopolistic power on the medical 
facilities that are in that area. Thinking in 
regional terms, each IRB could be 
competent for the whole region and, in this 
way, a regional competitive market of 
regulation would be created.  
This is the normative analysis on how a 
protection system should be shaped, 
according to the current knowledge and 
supported by the interpretation of the Data 
Envelopment Analysis’ results.  
However, even if IRBs were autonomous 
from the medical centers in which the trials 
are performed, their institution, as well as 
the members’ appointment, would be a 
decision of the general manager of those 
facilities.12 Obviously, the members’ 
                                                 
12 According to the 5th Report of the Italian National 
Drug Agency (2007), 78% of Italian IRBs have been 
instituted by these general managers. Obviously, 
these managers are also competent for the 
appointment of IRBs’ members, which is strictly 
related.    
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appointment is an opportunity to informally 
control the experimental activities, i.e. an 
opportunity to decide which medical 
researcher can perform, or not, a clinical 
trial. The tool to perform this unfair control 
could be, of course, the time needed to 
authorize a trial, i.e. the manipulation of 
transaction costs to perform an exchange 
between companies and patients. In other 
words, a trial in which the medical 
researcher has a friendly relationship with 
the management can be authorized, 
minimizing the expected transaction cost. 
At the same time, a medical researcher who 
is not on friendly terms with the 
management could be penalized, 
maximizing the expected transaction costs 
of an ethical decision. According to this 
approach, the protection system of patients’ 
rights sounds more like a system of political 
control on the pharmaceutical clinical 
research performed in public medical 
facilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The political necessity to guarantee this 
unfair control might be the real cause of the 
failed reform of the authorization process 
(second opinion).  
This hypothesis is even more consistent if 
we consider that the local network of 
protection and the appointment of general 
managers are of regional competence.      
Based on these considerations, political 
influence is the real problem of Italian 
competitiveness on the market of human 
experimentation. Only if the political power 
leaves the current protection system free to 
compete for a single opinion, i.e. without 
the need to approve what another board has 
already approved, the impact on national 
competitiveness could be significant. This 
could really affect the pharmaceutical 
companies’ decision making process about 
locations of clinical studies, thus leading to 
a higher expected supply of innovation in 
medical treatments. 
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